| 22. Frege's idea that every assertion contains an assumption, which is the thing that is asserted, really rests on the possibility found in our language of writing every statement in the form: "It is assert that such-and-such is the case."--- But "that such-and-such is the case" is not a sentence in our language---so far it is not a move in the language-game. And if I write, not "It is asserted that . . . .", but "It is asserted: such-and-such is the case", the words "It is asserted" simply become superfluous. | Still, there is the dream (such as Frege
had) of including some sort of notation in the body of the sentence
saying how it was used. For example, one might include a statement
such as "It is asserted that" and complete the sentence any such
way. Or, alternatively, one might do the same thing by saying "It is
asserted:" and complete the sentence any way.
But isn't it clear, at least in the last case, that the notation "It is asserted:" is superfluous? |
| We might very well also write every statement in the form of a
question followed by a "Yes"; for instance: "Is it raining?
Yes!" Would this shew that every statement contained a question?
|
Besides, there is nothing to guarantee that a notation "It is asserted:" will in fact be attached to an assertion. After all, don't we use questioning grammatical forms to make statements? Don't we say "It is a wonderful day, isn't it?" Even when we use formulations that seem to tell us how a sentence is being used, they need not accurately do so. |
| Of course we have the right to use an assertion sign in contrast with
a question-mark, for example, or if we want to distinguish an
assertion from a fiction or a supposition. It is only a mistake if one
thinks that the assertion consists of two actions, entertaining and
asserting (assigning the truth-value, or something of the kind), and that
in performing these actions we follow the prepositional sign roughly as we
sing from the musical score. Reading the written sentence loud or soft is
indeed comparable with singing from a musical score, but 'meaning'
(thinking) the sentence that is read is not.
Frege's assertion sign marks the beginning of the sentence. Thus its function is like that of full-stop. It distinguishes the whole period from a clause within the period. If I hear someone say "it's raining" but do not know whether I have heard the beginning and the end of the period, so far this sentence does not serve to tell me anything. |
But we can try to construct language so carry such a
notation accurately. The mistake is in thinking that it is the
notation that makes it so. What is in question is whether the
sentence is a question, and the notation does not make it so. The notation is only a label and a label can be correct or
misleading.
This means, when we determine that a statement is an assertion or a question, it is not enough to look to see what the notation (or punctuation) tells us. This information is not contained in the words, but in the way these words are being used in the language-game. Frege's notation that a sentence is an asssertion is like the full stop of a period at the end of string of words. Just as a period does not assure you that the sentence functions as a statement, however, so Frege's notation does guarantee that the sentence functions as the notation says. |
| See inserted comment of LW's. |
| 23. But how many kinds of sentence are
there? Say assertion, question, and command?--- There are countless kinds:
countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words",
"sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once
for all; but new types of language, new language- games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.) |
The rules of language games are not unchangeable laws. There is a continuous evolution not only in how many language games there are, but evolution, too, as to the kind of language games thee are. |
| Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the
fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of
a form of life.
|
We have seen this concept of langauge being woven in a form of life before. In (19), he said that to "imagine a language meant to imagine a form of life." And in (2) he pointed out that the slab language of that language-game involved not only words but activities, specifically, the activity of fetching objects on command. |
| Review the multiplicity of language-game in the following examples,
and in others:
|
Now that LW has taught us something about "language-games" he is going to give us samples to count. This serves as a kind of ostensive definition of language games, although, note, these examples differ from the primitive language games he talked about in 7 (which was illustrated by the slab language of 2 |
| * Giving orders, and obeying them--- * Describing the
appearance of an object, or giving its
measurements--- * Constructing an object from a description
(a drawing)--- * Reporting an
event--- * Speculating about an event--- * Forming and
testing a hypothesis--- * Presenting the results of an
experiment in tables and diagrams--- *
Making up a story; and reading it--- * Play-acting--- * Singing catches--- * Guessing riddles--- *
Making a joke; telling it--- * Solving a problem in practical
arithmetic--- * Translating from one language into
another--- * Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
---It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language.( Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.) |
It is a useful exercise to imagine a sentence of any
sort functioning in several of the different language games. When it
does this, it takes on a different meaning. For example, "There was
a storm today." Imagine how a sentence like this might function in
"reporting an event" "speculating about an event" "presenting results from
an experiment" "play acting" "singing catches" and so forth. Some
sentences, of course, do not make sense in all language games, but
whenever they do, they mean something different in different language
games.
Of course, Wittgenstein is himself the author of the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus. And, in that book, as well as in works by other authors of that era (e.g., Russell) language was seen as much more stable and finite.
|
| 24. If you do not keep the
multiplicity of language-games in view you will perhaps be inclined to ask
questions like: "What is a question?"---Is it the statement that I do not
know such-and-such, or the statement that I wish the other person would
tell me. . . .? Or is it the description of my mental state of uncertainty?---And is the cry "Help!" such a description?
|
Questions such as these, LW tells us, come about from
the Augustinian (Platonic and confused) understanding of language that is
our heritage. Why is this confused?
In my reading LW, it is because a "question" is just a grammatical form. It does not get at the activity of "asking". We can ask with cries such as
| ||
| Think how many different kinds of thing are called "description": description of a body's position by means of its co-ordinates; description of a facial expression; description of a sensation of touch; of a mood. | If asking what a question is reveals a hidden confusion, what about asking what a description is? | ||
| Of course it is possible to substitute the form of statement or description for the usual form of question: " I want to know whether . . . ." or "I am in doubt whether . . . ."---but this does not bring the different language-games any closer together. | Here, too, with descriptions, we find there is a surface form that does not tell us much about how the sentence is being used. Just as practically anything can be put in a questioning formt, so practically anything can be put in a descriptive format. | ||
| The significance of such possibilities of transformation, for example of turning all statements into sentences beginning "I think" or "I believe" (and thus, as it were, into descriptions of my inner life) will become clearer in another place. ( Solipsism.) | LW gives an account of pain language later that I think this refers to, but it is too early to get into this now. The important thing now to feel at home in his distinction between the surface of language (such as "What is a question") and the questions about the depth of language (how is the sentence functioning in the language game?) |
| 27. "We name things and then we can talk about
them: can refer to them in talk." 'As if what we did next were given with
the mere act of naming. As if there were only one thing called "talking
about a thing". Whereas in fact we do the most various things with our
sentences.
|
Isn't this exactly what the Augtinian picture of
language in (2)
implies? We name things and then we can talk about them. It is
as though this is all that is required.
But naming things, we have come to see, does not show us what to do with them. The workers might be able to name the beams, pillars, blocks and "slabs" and still not know to fetch them. Language is not just the uttering of words. It is the use of words in the activity of language. Also, the illusion that all we need to do to be able to talk is name things neglects how few of the words we use are actually names. | |
Think of exclamations alone, with their completely different
functions.
In languages (2) and (8) there was no
such thing as asking something's name. This, with its
|
Look at exclamations. Are these just names of
objects? Do you want to say that there is something internal that
these words name? Of course, someone uttering an exclamation like
this might have a image, but are they required?
In (2) and (8) the worker simply brought the objects required. There was no language for asking what something was called. Pointing and naming is a language game of its own. One must learn how to do this. And, in addition to learning to give the existing name of an object, one can learn how to invent names.
|
| 29. Perhaps you say: two can only be
ostensively defined in this way: "This number is called 'two' ".
For the word "number" here shews what place in language, in grammar, we
assign to the word. But this means that the word "number" must be
explained before the ostensive definition can be understood.
|
| ||
| --The word "number" in the definition does indeed shew this place;
does shew the post at which we station the word. And we can prevent
misunderstandings by saying: "This colour is called so-and-so", "This
length is called so-and-so", and so on. That is to say: misunderstandings
are sometimes averted in this way. But is there only one way of taking the
word "colour" or "length"?-Well, they just need defining.-Defining, then,
by means of other words! And what about the last definition in this chain?
(Do not say: "There isn't a 'last' definition". That is just as if
you chose to say: "There isn't a last house in this road; one
can always build an additional one''.)
|
Still, you might say, the 2 is in the right
place. One can see where 2 sits in the series of numbers. And
misunderstandings can sometimes be averted by pointing like this.
But how can we define number?
Can we do it by example? Should we use a figure like this:
| ||
| Whether the word "number" is necessary in the
ostensive definition depends on whether without it the other
person takes the definition otherwise than I wish. And that will depend on
the circumstances under which it is given, and on the person I give it
to.
|
But perhaps someone learns what two means in a
particular context, even without a completely adequate explanation for all
contexts. I ask for a ball and the child learns to fetch a
ball:
| ||
| And how he 'takes' the definition is seen in the use that he makes of the word defined. | But, if he "takes" it in the right way it will become a powerful and reinforcing tool. |
| 30. So one might say: the ostensive definition explains the use--the meaning--of the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear. Thus if I know that someone means to explain a colour-word to me the ostensive definition "That is called 'sepia' " will help me to understand the word. | In 30, Wittgenstein continues to investigate the Augustinian model and its problems as the total explanation for our developing language. This model, you'll recall, is based on the picture of words being defined ostensively, that is by naming and pointing. |
| --And you can say this, so long as you do not forget that all sorts of
problems attach to the words "to know" or "to be clear".
|
Someone from another country wants to teach you a word in her native language. She points to a pillow and make a strange sound "upapal" and your question is, "What is she pointing to? Is it the pillow or the shape of the pillow, or what?" But if you knew somehow that she was pointing to the color of the pillow, then that would make all the difference in the world. But that is because you know what "color" means. Imagine, then, how difficult it must be to learn a color word from an ostensive definition if you don't even have a concept of color. And, of course, all of us were in that place initially. isn't it remarkable that we learned anything at all from the experience? |
| One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to
be capable of asking a thing's name. But what does one have to
know?
|
If I already am quite clear about what a color word is, then I can begin to ask what the color of something is. If I know the term for color and my teacher knows the term for "color", too, then I am indeed a smart student. Just pointing and saying "that is the color sepia" should surely do it. But without those tools, things are going to be a lot tricker. |
| footnote: Could one define the word "red" by pointing to
something that was not red? That would be as if one were
supposed to explain the word "modest" to someone whose English was weak,
and one pointed to an arrogant man and said "That man is not modest". That
it is ambiguous is no argument against such a method of definition. Any
definition can be misunderstood.
But it might well be asked: are we still to call this "definition"?-- For, of course, even if it has the same practical consequences, the same effect on the learner, it plays a different part in the calculus from what we ordinarily call "ostensive definition" of the word "red". |
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